This study advances an entry/exit model to analyse the scale efficiency of UK building societies. We find that there are considerable divergences across building societies in levels of scale efficiency and also in technological change during the sample period 1992-1997. The paper also finds that scale economies and technological change estimates are dependent on whether the econometrician balances a panel data set or utilises the entry/exit model based on Dionne et al's (1998) specification. In general, scale economies in UK building societies are found to be more significant and more pervasive than in previous studies.
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Introduction
UK building societies are mutual institutions regulated by statute and historically were restricted, in the main, to raising funds from retail deposits and intermediating these funds into mortgage lending. The Building Societies Act 1986, however, enabled building societies to diversify into a much wider range of housing related and retail financial services and to diversify their assets, within limits, away from the traditional (Class 1) mortgage lending. The powers to hold so-called Class 2 and Class 3 assets enabled building societies to undertake commercial and second mortgage lending, unsecured consumer lending, and to make investments in subsidiaries and associated bodies. The more recent 1997 legislation removed most of the remaining restrictions and building societies can now effectively be viewed as mutual retail banks or mutual retail financial services organisations.
In addition to the diversification powers outlined above, the UK building society movement has also undergone considerable consolidation in recent years, both as a consequence of mergers within the mutual building society sector, and due to the conversion of a number of the larger building societies to plc bank status. In 1992 for example, there were 86 UK building societies, but by 1997 this number had fallen to 70.
This consolidation phase in the UK building society sector echoes the trend towards rationalisation and mergers evident in UK and US banking and indeed in financial services markets around the world. Although the converted building societies do receive 5 years protection from take-over following plc conversion, it seems likely that we will ultimately see further consolidation in UK banking, following the recent examples of Lloyds-TSB and the Royal Bank of Scotland and Nat West, and some of this may well involve the so called "mortgage banks".
Against this backdrop of consolidation and increased merger activity, it is clear that the issue of economies of scale is extremely important in the context of UK banking and retail financial services. In contrast to the wealth of research conducted in this area in the US, however, there has been a dearth of such academic research in the UK. This possibly reflects the small number of banks operating in the UK compared to the huge sample sizes available in the US. Despite the recent decline in numbers, however, UK building societies do represent a reasonable sample size for academic research, especially in the context of panel data samples. Furthermore, the diversification of building societies in recent years, coupled with the conversion of a number of the larger societies into plc banks, implies that this sector can provide a highly informative case study of the nature of scale economies and the size efficiency relationship in the UK retail financial services market.
Although previous empirical work has been conducted into UK building societies by, for example, Hardwick (1989) , Drake (1992) and Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) , the data utilised was typically cross section and related to the 1980s. In general these studies tended to indicate that only modest economies of scale were present and that they were exhausted at relatively low asset levels. This echoed the type of evidence emerging from the US banking literature in the 1980s and implied that alternative explanations should be sought for large scale mergers.
Evidence has recently emerged from the US, however, which suggests that scale economy estimates can be sensitive to the particular cost function specification and to the impact of technological innovation on costs (see Berger and Mester, 1997) . The latter point also suggests that scale economy estimates may also be sample specific. In particular, it may be the case that the results obtained using data from the 1990s may be very different from those obtained during the 1980s due to the significant impact of new technology over the last decade or so.
Hence, the aim of this paper is to provide a reappraisal of the evidence on scale economies in UK building societies, thereby providing some important insights in respect of the market for retail financial services in the UK. In order to do this we specify and estimate a translog cost function using a panel data set drawn from the 1990s. We pay particular attention, however, to the robustness of the cost model and to the possibility of mis-specification which could bias the scale economy estimates. A particular innovation in this paper is the incorporation of both Hunter and Timme's (1991) technological change specification and Dionne et al's (1998) entry/exit equation, together with the application of a general to specific testing procedure applied to the translog cost function specification. The specification of an entry/exit model may be particularly appropriate for the building society sector given the propensity for exit via mergers and conversion.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section II outlines the estimation methodology; section III provides details of the data; section IV provides a discussion of the estimations and results, and finally, section V concludes.
Estimation Methodology
To formalise the problem we can draw on the following model. Begin by defining the variables:
where it y -a vector of outputs of society i at period t, , and t -a index of technological change.
is the society's input requirement set of feasible input bundles it x , that can be used to obtain a predetermined output vector, it y (such as consumer loans). The production function is also at least twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in it
x . In addition, the cost function ( )
is increasing in it y and it w , homogeneous of degree zero, and concave in it w .
The model estimated in this paper is an extension of Hunter and Timme's (1991) technological change specification and Dionne et al's (1998) entry/exit equation. That is, we utilise the first specification to obtain two types of technological change estimates, and the second specification to take account of the unbalanced panel data set. The latter is particularly important when analysing UK building societies as the sector has undergone a considerable degree of consolidation in recent years. This consolidation is attributable both to mergers within the mutual building society sector and to the conversion of some of the larger building societies to Plc bank status.
Hence, the data set utilised in this paper is unbalanced because some building societies had incomplete records over the total sample. In standard estimates of cost efficiency and scale economies, those building societies with incomplete records would have been excluded from the sample (see for example, Berger (1993 ), DeYoung (1997 , and for a bank branch X-efficiency study Berger, Leusner and Mingo (1997) ). This would imply that 17 building societies over the complete sample would be excluded from our estimations. However, Olley and Pakes (1998) 
and including the entry and exit equations it it However, given the cost function in equation (1) it has been argued in the literature that there is a possible identification problem in production modeling, especially when a single industry is estimated due to the fact that certain cost items influence the size of the bank (see Thomas (1985) , Chapter 8). In our specification, this problem can be discounted for two reasons. Firstly, we assume that the larger building societies had a greater share of the market and were more able to price discriminate on products than their smaller competitors. The market is therefore assumed to be imperfectly competitive. The second assumption concerns the error structure of the translog cost function and share equations. All share equation errors are contemporaneously correlated with the translog cost function error term. The nonzero contemporaneous error could be attributable to a mis-specification of the translog cost function, i.e., the result of errors in cost minimisation by managers and other factors that are not modeled explicitly. Examples might include regional rent and price differences for offices, or variations in the ability of managers across building societies. The latter two assumptions allow us to estimate a cost function for the industry where the building societies have similar inputs and outputs, but different cost structures. That is, we estimate a model that excludes random and fixed effects thereby further simplifying the distributional assumptions of Dionne et al (1998) .
In addition, we extend Dionne et al's (1998) 
and the entry and exit equations are specified as, 
To calculate overall economies of scale (OES), the translog cost function (5) is differentiated with respect to output (Panzar and Willig (1977) ),
Where MC i is the marginal cost with respect to the ith output and There are two types of technical change that we can estimate from the translog cost function (see Hunter and Timme (1991) ). The first is an overall measure which is the percentage change in the cost of inputs resulting from changes in intermediary technology, holding everything else in equation (5) constant (see also Simper (1999) , and Glass and McKillop (1992) for an application to an Irish Bank). If TECH is less than zero, then a building societies outputs can be produced at a lower total cost as a result of technological change.
( )
The second technical change concept measures the scale biased technological change of UK building societies along the ray average cost curve. The scale biased technical change measure is given by equation (11).
If TECHSB is less than zero then, for a given product mix, technological change causes larger building societies to be more efficient over time than their smaller competitors and hence helps to minimise costs.
Data
The sample of building societies include all those that were listed in the Building Societies Association (BSA) year books from 1992 -1997 (86 societies to 70 societies respectively). The modelling methodology in this paper follows the standard intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1976) in which the financial institution is assumed to intermediate deposits into various categories of earning assets using labour and capital inputs. Hence, deposits are specified as inputs alongside the usual economic factors of production.
In this paper we specify 3 inputs and 3 outputs (see Table 1 for summary statistics). Total deposits include both retail and wholesale funds and the input price is calculated as interest costs per pound of total deposits. The input price for labour is calculated as total employment costs divided by the number of full time equivalent (FTE)
employees. In calculating FTE numbers, full time staff are given a weight of 1 and part time staff a weight of 0.5.
Finally, capital costs are calculated as all other non-labour and non-interest expenses, including items such as depreciation and auditing. The input price of capital is calculated by dividing capital expenses by the net book value of fixed assets. This is also the approach adopted, inter alia, by Hardwick (1989) and Drake and Wyman-Jones (1996) .
INSERT TABLE 1
The first output is mortgages secured on residential property (Class 1 loans), the second is loans secured on land and unsecured loans (Class 2 and Class 3 loans). Finally to take account of non-traditional building society business, the third output is the summation of commissions and other fee income from operations as well as interest received on liquid assets. This final output category reflects the fact that many of the new business areas will fee income rather than the traditional margin income.
In addition to enable further analysis, societies were sub-divided in terms of their total asset size. Group A had assets over £5 billion, asset group B £0.5 billion -£5 billion, asset group C £0.12 billion -£0.5 billion, asset group D £0.05 billion -£0.12 billion, and asset group E were building societies with total assets up to £0.05 billion.
Estimation and Results
The summary regularity test results, and economies of scale and technological change estimates for the entry/exit technological change model are presented in Tables 2   and 3 . In the former Table, we have presented the results from the augmented branch entry/exit model, and in the latter we present estimates from models excluding the number of branches. Therefore, our econometric methodology is one in which we test from the most general specification stage 1AA which includes the control variable branches, to the standard translog cost function estimates in Drake (1992) , Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) and Simper (1998) ).
The translog cost function has been shown to have stability problems when estimated with diverse cross sectional data, see Rossi (1985) , Westbrook and Buckly (1990) and Shaffer (1998) , and in banking where small intermediaries could bias estimates, see McAllister and McManus (1993) . The potential of the translog cost function to exhibit instability implies that a robust testing procedure should be carried out before any analysis of the results is discussed. To ensure that the estimated translog function satisfies the necessary conditions for a cost function, the results of three regularity tests are also presented in Tables 2 and 3 . The first test estimates the marginal costs of outputs 1, 2 and 3 (MC Y1, MC Y2 and MC Y3 respectively), which should be positive. Secondly, standard production theory requires that the own-price elasticities be negative, indicating a concave cost function (Con P1, Con P2 and Con P3 INSERT TABLE 2   INSERT TABLE 3 Generally, each model performs well in terms of the necessary regularity conditions. For example, the marginal costs of outputs in stage 1AA were significant and positive for 100% of building societies for output 1, 97.44% for output 2 and 98.51% for output 3. In addition, the curvature conditions are significantly negative for own price elasticities 2 and 3 at the mean and insignificant for input 1. This condition is satisfied for 41.79% of all building societies for input 1, and for 99.79% for input 2 and 92.96%
for input 3. 3 Finally, the share equations are both significantly positive at the mean and this condition is satisfied at 100% of the data points. Hence, we can conclude that we are satisfied with the regularity of the translog cost functions over the sample period.
In assessing which model fits the data best we conduct likelihood ratio tests starting from the most general and moving to the most specific model. In our analysis we divide the stages into two sub-categories; the model that includes the branch control variables (stage 1AA) and those that exclude the branch control variables (stages 1A to 3B). There are two reasons for this split analysis. Firstly, the branch control variables have a substantial and significant effect on the scale economies estimates obtained (see Table 2 ), and therefore presents us with a different policy conclusion. This is potentially important as for many building societies branches are a very important component of their delivery channel. Previous studies such as Hardwick (1989 and 1990 ) and Drake (1992) incorporated branching in their cross-section translog cost function specifications.
Hence, the inclusion of branching facilitates a more direct contrast of previous empirical economies of scale estimates.
Secondly, an important element of this paper is the testing of the impact of the entry/exit model and the technological change specification on the results derived from the Translog cost function. Having established the impact of branching in moving from models 1AA to model 1A, we chose to undertake the further sequential testing in the context of the standard translog specification, ie, excluding the various branching terms.
Hence, the second stage analysis (see Table 3 and significant. This is not surprising given the consolidation within the sector and hence the propensity for exit via either mergers or conversion to Plc bank status. This result does confirm, however, the importance of specifying these entry/exit dummy variables in the estimated cost function.
Overall, when including the branch control variables, the preferred stage 1AA model fits the data well, with an R 2 for the cost function equal to 0.99, and for cost share equations 2 and 3 equal to 0.63 and 0.50 respectively. 4 We also find that in the entry and exit equations, 90% and 75% of estimated parameters respectively are significantly different from zero. When we exclude the branch control variables, stage 1A, the R 2 for the cost function is still equal to 0.99, and for cost share equations 2 and 3 this declines slight to equal 0.52 and 0.45 respectively. We next discuss the results from the various stages of model estimation and examine how the re-balancing of the sample affects the economies of scale estimates. Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) found evidence of constant returns at the sample mean using a cross-section translog cost function without the incorporation of branching. An interesting feature of the results in Table 3 , however, is that the results do seem to be sensitive to the exclusion of the technical change parameters. As we move from stages 1A to 1B, for example, the mean economies of scale estimate increases from 0.970 to 0.985 (both significantly different from unity). These results support the contention of Dionne et al that rebalancing samples can introduce bias into the results and provide a justification for the use of unbalanced panels in conjunction with an entry/exit methodology.
Economies of Scale.

The Size Efficiency Relationship
Of potentially greater interest than the mean scale economy estimates, from a strategic and policy perspective, is information concerning the relationship between scale efficiency and the size of building societies. This information is provided in Tables 2 and   3 A particularly interesting feature of the results, however, is that the scale economy estimate begins to fall again as we move from group B to group A (OES A=0.916). In addition, a one-way ANOVA was estimated to determine whether there is a significant difference between the group mean economies of scale for stage 1AA. An F statistic of 15.353 rejects the null of equal asset group means.
6
The latter result suggests that some of the larger building societies may experience more significant economies of scale than their smaller competitors. One possible explanation for this type of result is the impact of new technology. This hypothesis is given some credence by the fact that although TEC is typically not significant, the scale biased technological change measure (TECHSB) is negative and significant. This suggests that technological change causes larger building societies to be more efficient over time than their smaller competitors and hence is a potential source of observed economies of scale. It is also worth noting from Table 3 that the likelihood ratio tests reject the elimination of the third order technological change terms (i.e., stages 1A to 1B, 2A to 2B, etc), thus emphasising the importance of allowing for the potential impact of new technology on costs in retail financial services.
A further important finding in these results is the evidence of pervasive and substantial economies of scale at all size levels within the UK building society industry.
Again, this result is in marked contrast with the evidence provided in previous studies.
Hardwick (1989) , for example, concludes that "societies with assets of less than £280m can achieve statistically significant economies of scale, but that there are no significant economies to be achieved by the growth of larger societies" (p 1303). Similarly, Drake (1992) maintains that "scale economies are evident only for the C class societies, i.e., building societies with assets of between £120m and £500m. For all other asset groups the evidence suggests that constant returns prevail as the scale economy measures are not significantly different from unity.
Possible explanations for the substantial difference between the scale economy estimates found in this paper and those found in previous studies relate to differences in the sample period used, the econometric methodologies employed, and the impact of technology. The earlier studies employed cross section data from the 1980s. In contrast, this study uses panel data from the 1990s and uses a general to specific econometric methodology to test the robustness of the cost function estimation. In particular, our estimates specifically incorporate an entry/exit model in the context of an unbalanced panel as well as allowing explicitly for the impact of new technology.
Similar evidence of differences in scale economy estimates over time has also been found in the context of US banking. Berger and Mester (1997) , for example, find that in every size class banks exhibited unexploited economies of scale. They argue that "these findings differ from most of those using 1980s data, in which large banks were typically found to be operating at constant returns to scale or with slight diseconomies of scale. In almost all cases, cost scale economies were exhausted well below $10m in assets." (p 927). Furthermore, in explaining the differences between the results, they highlight differences in cost function specifications and the fact that "improvements in technology and applied finance may have reduced costs more for large banks than for small banks." (p 929).
Further inspection of Table 3 It is clear, therefore, that a mis-specified model could produce extremely misleading strategic implications. The latter results, for example, would suggest that the smallest building societies would be likely to be at a significant disadvantage relative to their larger competitors, but that they could not expect to see significant unit cost reductions from either organic growth or mergers with other relatively small building societies. The obvious strategic implication would be that these small societies should merge with, or transfer their engagements to, much larger building societies with the potential to exhibit considerable economies of scale.
In contrast, our preferred branch augmented stage 1AA model suggests that there are very significant unexploited scale economies at all size levels and that the smaller societies can generate cost efficiency gains from both organic growth and smaller scale mergers.
Conclusions
This paper produces important new evidence on the issue of economies of scale in UK building societies and thereby provides insights in respect of the size-efficiency relationship in the relatively neglected area of UK retail banking/retail financial services.
Our results echo the findings of Berger and Mester (1997) for the US and suggest that economies of scale estimates can be extremely sensitive to the cost model estimated.
Using a general to specific modeling procedure which incorporates both an entry/exit model and a technological change specification we are able to identify a preferred cost model which produces empirical scale economy estimates very different from those obtained in previous research.
In contrast to previous studies, our results are entirely consistent with the recent merger and consolidation wave in banking and financial services as we find substantial and pervasive economies of scale for all sizes of building societies. We also find evidence that technological progress tends to reduce the costs of larger societies relative to their smaller competitors, thereby enhancing potential economies of scale. These results suggest a strong cost reducing rationale for mergers even with respect to relatively large building societies with assets of over £5 billion.
Hence, we would expect to see further mergers/consolidation within the UK retail financial services sector, particularly when our evidence concerning economies of scale and technology effects are combined with the rationalisation potential which mergers bring. With the arrival of new delivery channels such as telephone and internet banking, many financial services organisations are finding that the rationalisation of branches, infrastructure and staff is more easily accomplished following a merger in which the costly duplication of resources can be eliminated.
There has been considerable debate in the literature and amongst analysts concerning the future of smaller building societies. One view is that these institutions can survive by being highly focused on a narrow range of products, and by cultivating their local presence. This view, however, rests on the assumption that a narrow focus can deliver a relatively low cost base. While this may facilitate X-efficiency (operating closer to the minimum attainable costs for a given output level) it can do nothing to alleviate the problems of scale inefficiency ( failure to operate at the minimum efficient scale). Previous results have suggested that this is not a serious problem as only modest economies existed and these were exhausted at relatively low asset levels. The new evidence provided in this paper, however, suggests that smaller societies may be in a much more vulnerable position. Considerable scale economies appear to prevail at all asset sizes and the smallest building societies appear to have the largest unexploited economies of scale. Hence, other things equal (such as X-efficiency), these smaller societies would be expected to exhibit the highest unit costs. Our evidence suggests that these societies will also benefit less in a dynamic context from the cost reducing potential of new technology. Clearly, these pressures are likely to intensify in an increasingly competitive financial services marketplace and may well result in increased numbers of mergers involving the smaller building societies.
Due to the nature of the sample analysed, our results do not allow us to provide any insights concerning the nature of scale economies for very large institutions such as Lloyds Bank or Nat West. Hence, we cannot provide any empirical evidence pertaining to mergers such as Lloyds-TSB or Nat West-Royal Bank of Scotland. The agenda for future research should therefore include an analysis of the size-efficiency relationship with respect to large-scale banks and financial services organisations, and also an examination of X-inefficiency as well as scale inefficiency. OES E 0.8991a (0.0358) (Standard errors are in parentheses; ** denotes significance at the 1% and * denotes significance 5% critical level; % is the percentage number of UK building societies that fail to reject the null hypothesis of the necessary relevant condition; L. L. is the Log Likelihood of the function; m.d.v is the mean of the dependent variable, s.e. reg is the standard error of the regression; and a denotes significantly different from one at the 5% critical level). 26
